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AIDS-Related Dementia and
Competency to Stand Trial: A
Potential Abuse of the Forensic
Mental Health System?
Michael L. Perlin, Esq; and Joel A. Dvoskin, PhD
Public health officials, hospital administrators, forensic directors, jail wardens,
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys must confront the issue: how should
cases of individuals with AIDS dementia be treated when they are found to be
permanently incompetent to stand trial? Although charges are sometimes dismissed
in advanced cases of dementia, the more common pattern involves placement of
the defendant in a public facility while awaiting trial. The refusal of some state
facilities to accept these patients raises a host of legal, moral, and medical questions
that virtually every urban state's forensic system will have to consider in the near
future.

On two occasions in the past two years,
New York state trial court judges have
dismissed felony charges against defendants suffering from acquired immune
deficiency syndrome dementia (AIDS
dementia) with an extremely limited life
expectancy, holding that, given the uncontroverted medical testimony, it
~ould be purposeless to try, convict, and
imprison the defendant. 1 Although these
cases have received little attention, the
decisions promise to herald a new chapter in criminal procedure law: the disposition of cases of defendants incom-
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petent to stand trial because of AIDS
dementia.
Since 1981, AIDS and related disorders have grown from an unknown phenomenon into a tragedy of epidemic
proporiions. 2 It is estimated that the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 3
has already infected more than two million people in the United States alone,
99 percent of whom will develop AIDS. 4
Epidemiologists have substantiated that
one extremely high risk group of candidates for these diseases arc intravenous
(IV) drug users. predominantly those
whose abuse of illegal drugs and whose
consequent adoption of a criminal lifestyle make them likely candidates for
the criminal justice system. As the President's Commission recently reported,
"The future course of the HIV epidemic
depends greatly on the effectiveness of
our nation's ability to address IV drug
349
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abuse." 5 It is estimated that IV drug
abusers constitute 25 percent of all AIDS
cases in the United States. 6
Thus, it is not surprising that prisons
house a disproportionate number of persons with AIDS. 7 By mid-1987, there
were over 2,000 confirmed AIDS cases
in prisons across the country, marking
"the most concentrated population in
any setting. " 8 In New York, for instance,
during the years 1982 to 1987, a total of
548 inmate deaths were attributed to
AIDS. 9 A seroprevalence study of the
New York state prison system tested
blood samples of 494 consecutively admitted male inmates; 17.4 percent tested
positive for the HIV virus, with higher
rates found for inmates from New York
City (20.2 %) and for Hispanic inmates
(24.7 %). 10 Among inmates who acknowledged using IV drugs, the prevalence rate was 44. l percent. 11 This 17.4
percent rate would thus yield a predicted
incidence of7,830 HIV infected inmates
(of a population of about 45,000).
Predictably, these problems have not
limited themselves to the criminal justice system. 12 The public mental health
system in New York, a system whose
clients frequently share many demographic and socioeconomic characteristics with correctional clients, has begun
to face an emerging problem of AIDS
infections within state psychiatric centers as well. 13 From 1983 until late 1988,
of a total universe of between 15,000
and 20,000 patients, l 04 patients in New
York state psychiatric centers had confirmed AIDS diagnoses. 14 Most recently,
a study has revealed that one in every
l 7 patients institutionalized in mental
350

hospitals in New York City may be infected with the AIDS virus. 14 a
It is virtually certain that problems
shared by the criminal justice and mental health systems will also be experienced by that system that links the
two-the forensic mental health system.1 5 It is therefore not surprising that
Central New York Psychiatric Center.
the New York facility that provides inpatient psychiatric services for transfers
from the state correctional system, has
already treated eight cases of individuals
with AIDS, and has attributed six deaths
to that disease. 16 In addition, a small
number of nonsentenced forensic patients-individuals hospitalized either
following a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, or pursuant to a finding
of incompetency to stand trial-have
also developed symptoms leading to an
AIDS diagnosis. 17
The harsh reality that forensic units
have traditionally been viewed as "a resource of last resort"-generally hidden
from public view and interest' 8-has
had four additional AIDS-related consequences: first, they become an appealing alternative to which local jailstraditionally overcrowded and understaffed 18"-can seek to transfer their
most "difficult" to manage AIDS patients; second, such facilities simply lack
the expertise and the resources to provide the needed care to persons with
AIDS who are thus likely to receive inadequate medical treatment; third, forensic units are now forced to provide
closely rationed psychiatric resources to
a population whose basic needs are medical care and dignified treatment. fiBull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990
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nally, persons with AIDS in forensic
units, often located far from urban population centers, are, like all other forensic patients, subject to the general internal rules and regulations governing such
units. As a result, they have lessened
opportunities for visits and social contacts with friends, families and loved
ones, 18 b a problem that is exacerbated in
cases of individuals with terminal illnesses. It is this set of problems-specifically, the plight of individuals suffering
from "AIDS dementia" who are institutionalized while awaiting trial on
criminal charges-that is in specific
need of serious consideration. 19
In an effort to examine these problems, we discuss the creation of AIDS
dementia as a diagnostic category (Part
I), give a brief account of the procedures
that are followed when there is a question as to an individual's competency to
stand trial for a criminal offense (Part
II), and examine the way these procedures "play out" in cases of AIDS dementia (Part III). Finally, we will examine some of the questions raised by
this analysis in an effort to set a focus
on those issues to which greater attention must be paid (Part IV). 20
I. AIDS Dementia

Although new drugs such as Zidovudine (AZT) have apparently begun to
extend the lives of some AIDS-affiicted
individuals, and while better health care
has become available to some members
of this class, 21 there is a cruelly ironic
consequence of especial significance to
forensic patients with AIDS: some now
live long enough to develop "AIDS deBull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990

mentia " 22 as a direct consequence of the
disease. 23 AIDS dementia, a progressive
deterioration of mental function, is now
considered the most common nervous
system disease associated with HIV infection. 24 According to Dr. Richard
Johnson and his colleagues:
The dementia begins with apathy, memory
loss, and involvement of the motor system
characterized by an increase in tone, accentuated deep tendon reflexes, and clumsiness.
This syndrome progresses to a global dementia
with abulia, mutism, spasticity, and incontinence. This has been described as a subcortical
dementia ... with inappropriate behavior and
problems with language and perception commonly seen with disorders such as Alzheimer's
disease. 25

It is estimated that, eventually, 60 to
70 percent of all AIDS patients will develop AIDS dementia, 26 and that the
mean survival time from onset of dementia to death is only six months (although some patients remain stable for
prolonged periods of time). 27
Thus, if such individuals are charged
with a criminal offense while already
suffering from AIDS, or, if they develop
AIDS while incarcerated in jail awaiting
trial, it is likely that, in a significant
number of such cases, there will be a
judicial determination of their competency to stand trial. 28 As wi II be discussed
in Part II, if it is determined that an
individual is unlikely to regain this trial
competency in the "forseeable future,"
the state is constitutionally compelled to
either release the person or initiate customary civil commitment proceedings
against him. 29 It is critical that the potential outcomes of such proceedings be
considered: what procedures must be invoked when there is a "bona fide
351
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doubt" 30 as to a defendant's competency
to stand trial ,3 1 and what are the constitutional, social policy and medical ramifications of such proceedings in the specific context of individuals with AIDS
dementia? 3 13

II. Incompetency to Stand Trial
Procedures 32
Statutory Procedures One cannot be
tried for a criminal offense if a judge
determines that he lacks "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him"; it is not
enough for the judge simply to find that
"the defendant is oriented to time and
place and [has] some recollection of
even ts [.] " 33
The test is generally seen as a cognitive
one; among the questions asked are:
does the defendant have the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place, and things? Next,
are the defendant's elementary mental
processes such that he comprehends that
he is in a court of justice charged with a
criminal offense; that there is a judge on
the bench; that there is a prosecutor
present who will try to convict him of a
criminal charge; that he has a lawyer
who will undertake to defend him
against that charge; that he will be expected to tell to the best of his ability the
facts surrounding him at the time and
place where the alleged violation was
committed if he chooses to testify and
understands the right not to testify; that
there is or may be a jury present to pass
352

upon evidence adduced as to guilt or
innocence of such charges or, that if he
should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead guilty, that he comprehend the consequences of any guilty
plea and that he be able to knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waive those
rights that are waived upon such entry
of a guilty plea; and, that he has the
ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense. 34
If a person is not competent to so
stand trial, he can be institutionalized in
a forensic facility until a determination
is made as to whether he is likely to
regain his competence to stand trial in
the "foreseeable future. " 35 If regaining
competency is not likely in the foreseeable future, then, according to the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1972 decision of Jackson v. Indiana, the state is constitutionally required to either release that person
or institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required
to commit any other citizen. Likewise,
if it is determined that the defendant
"probably soon will be able to stand trial,
his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal. " 36
In New York State, for instance, 37
once the court is satisfied that the person
is not competent to stand trial, it must
issue a final or temporary order of observation committing the individual to
the custody of the state commissioner of
mental health or retardation for care and
treatment in an appropriate institution
for a period not to exceed ninety days
from the date of the order. 38
After a judgment of incompetency,
the need for continued hospitalization is
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990
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subject to ongoing judicial review, a procedure analogous to ci vii commitment. 39
If, at the conclusion of the hearing,40 the
court is satisfied that the defendant is
competent to stand trial, the criminal
action against the defendant must proceed. On the other hand, if the court is
satisfied that the defendant continues to
be incompetent to stand trial, or if no
demand for a hearing is made, the court
must adjudicate him an incapacitated
person and must issue an order of retention authorizing continued custody of
the defendant by the commissioner for
a period not to exceed one year. 41 Once
a defendant has been committed to the
custody of the commissioner, he must
be placed in an appropriate institution
operated by the department of mental
health or retardation. 42
Implications of AIDS Dementia
Given the level of deterioration of
functioning in individuals with AIDS
dementia,43 and the likelihood that such
persons develop characteristics similar
to patients suffering from such global
subcortical disorders as Alzheimer's disease,44 it is not surprising to suggest that
most of this population would fit
squarely within the language of the
Jackson decision as unable to stand trial
"within the foreseeable future. " 45 At that
point, the focus shifts to the next levels
of inquiry: how are the underlying cases
to be disposed of, and, simply, what
happens to the defendant?
To the lay public, it might seem altogether appropriate that individuals with
AIDS dementia remain incarceratedfor life-in forensic facilities, since such
individuals(!) are afflicted with what is
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990

generally viewed as a pern1c1ous and
highly communicable physiological disease, that has apparent psychological
side effects, and (2) have been charged
with the commission of serious crime.
This apparently commonsensical approach, however, is deeply flawed. 46
First, the treatment goals of forensic patients are determined primarily by their
legal status. For patients found incompetent to stand trial, the predominant
goal of treatment is to restore the person 's capacity to stand trial , and not to
provide long-term psychiatric care. 47
One cannot simply be "banished" to
such an institution because society is
unable to conceptualize a better placement. Any decision as to long-term
placement must be based on factors beyond the simple fact that the individual
has been charged with some level of
criminal offense. 48 Second, the United
States Supreme Court made crystal-clear
17 years ago in Jackson that the federal
constitution forbids holding a pretrial
detainee "more than the reasonable
period of time necessary to determine
whether there is a substantial probability
that he will attain that capacity [i.e. ,
competence to stand trial] in the foreseeable future. " 49 Third , these individuals have not been convicted of any
criminal offense, 50 and thus are constitutionally not subject to punishment. 5'
Fourth, forensic units are generally not
staffed with professionals suitably
trained in the medical treatment of neurological disorders such as AlDS dementia. Such units are not set up to serve as
long-term facilities for nonambulatory
patients, a category that encompasses
353
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many individuals with AIDS dementia. 52
All participants in the system-public
health officials, hospital administrators,
forensic directors, jail wardens, judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneysm ust thus step back and confront this
issue: how should cases of individuals
with AIDS dementia be treated when
they are found to be permanently incompetent to stand trial? 53
Ill. Recent New York
Developments
As discussed above, state criminal trial
court judges have recently dismissed
criminal charges in felony cases involving defendants with AIDS dementia " in
an advanced stage, with extremely limited life expectancies, and who were ' not
likely to recover. "' 54 In People v. Quinn,
the judge heard uncontroverted testimony from the defendant's supervising
physician at a private hospital that the
nonambulatory, wheelchair-bound defendant "could not withstand a trial of
any duration. " 55 The court concluded
that Quinn-who had been charged with
attempted murder, assault, and weapons
possession-was in an "extremely incapacitated state of health" with an "extremely bleak" prognosis. 56
After balancing the defendant's interests with those of the state, the court
examined the statutory criteria (discussed in Part II, above) and ordered the
charges dismissed. Although the defendant had been indicted for a "very serious
crime" and the state alleged that it had
"ample evidence of his guilt," in view of
the defendant's "mentally impaired condition " and of his " progressive physical
354

deterioration ,'' it concluded that the
likelihood of the defendant's ability to
stand trial was "at best remote. " 57
Even if he were tried and convicted,
the court continued, there would be no
penological purpose in imposing a
prison sentence "when he has been sentenced to a much harsher fate and indeed almost certain death from the
AIDS disease. " 58 The decision to dismiss
the indictment "should not impact upon
the confidence of the public in the criminal justice system," the court underscored, as the defendant, in his "dire
circumstances" could not be considered
a community threat "since it is most
unlikely that he will ever walk the streets
again. " 59
In People v. Ortiz , the court ordered
weapons and narcotics charges dismissed under a separate section of the
state criminal procedure act that allows
for such an action when there is "any
compelling reason exist[ing] to demonstrate that conviction or prosecution of
a defendant would result in an injustice. " 60 It concluded with a (rare for a
judicial opinion) epigram from Longfellow: "Mercy more becomes a magistrate
than the vindictive wrath which men call
justice. " 6 1
The court's disposition of these cases
appear totally consistent with both the
constitutional framework set out in
Jackson and the procedural scheme contained in the state statute (although Ortiz was ultimately decided on an "interests of justice" theory rather than on
substantive competency law). It must be
noted, however, that Quinn arose in the
context of a private hospital patient, and
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990
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that Ortiz's sister promised the court
that she would provide nursing care for
her brother (whose life expectancy was
less than 90 days). 62 What additional
issues are raised in the more common
fact pattern, where the defendant is in a
public facility awaiting trial?
In the past several months, commitment has been sought by state trial
courts to the New York State Office of
Mental Health (OMH) after findings of
incompetence to stand trial, 63 the defendants' incompetence stemming primarily from AIDS dementia. 64 Each of
the three received intensive medical care
while in jail before his transfer,65 and at
least one had received OMH services
prior to the onset of AIDS dementia. 66
In each case, OMH resisted acceptance
of the patient; and , in the one case where
transfer was actually effectuated (and the
one which in which the patient is still
living), it was done only after protracted
negotiations as a result of which the
sending city jail agreed to provide the
state with the needed requisite medical
backup services. 67 In short, no state facility in New York was willing to accept-without more-forensic referrals
of patients with AIDS who were also
found incompetent to stand trial. 68
IV. Unanswered Questions
This refusal raises a plethora of legal
and related humanitarian issues. 69 First,
was the incompetency mechanism properly invoked in these cases? 70 Under
Jackson and New York's criminal procedure law, due process requires that the
nature and duration of commitment
bear "some reasonable relation to the
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990

purpose for which the individual is committed. " 7 1 In each of the three cases in
question , clinical opinion was unanimous: the defendants were permanently
and terminally incompetent, and there
was thus no "reasonable likelihood" of
restoration in the "foreseeable future" ;
under these circumstances, is a postincompetency
commitment
ever
proper? 72 Second, if it were not proper,
to what sort of facility should the defendants be committed?7 3 Third, do hospitals-forensic or otherwise-have a
right to refuse such patients? If they do
not, what sanctions, if any, are available?
Fourth, what will happen if the defendant remains committed-awaiting
trial-for a period of time longer than
the maximum for which he could be
sentenced had he been convicted of the
underlying crime?7 4 Fifth, no matter
where the defendant is, does he have a
right to medical care?75 If so, does that
contemplate expensive, experimental
treatments such as AZT, treatments that
may not yet be available to the general
community? Sixth, ~[the Jackson case is
invoked, and the defendant transferred
to a civil hospital, of what applicability
are such doctrines as the right to treatment, 76 the right to refuse treatment, 77
the right to least restrictive alternative, 78
or, conversely, the "right to die"?7 9 Although these cases have generally been
litigated in New York and elsewhere on
behalf of individuals suffering from
mental illness80 or those who are mentally retarded, 8 1 there appear to be no
principled reasons why the doctrines developed in such cases should not be similarly applicable to persons with AIDS
355

Perlin and Dvoskin

dementia. Seventh, what impact will the
presence of such patients-largely untreatable through traditional psychiatric
methods-have on the treatment-responsiveness of other "regular" psychiatric patients on the wards in question?
Eighth, how will the intractable financial issues be sorted out? Is Medicaid
funding available in such cases?82 If it is,
what impact does forensic placement
have on the possibility of such funding?
Is it permissible for these factors to influence the disposition of the case? Ninth,
is AIDS dementia, simply, "different" 83
(because of the additional layers of
stigma and the special problems associated with contagion)?84 If so, and if medical care is thus seen as a more pressing
need than psychiatric care (if such "psychiatric care" as it is commonly thought
of is even meaningfully possible), how
will the quality of that care be assessed?
Then, what are the goals of care: to
sustain life, to extend life, to allow for
death-with-dignity,85 to protect the
safety of others, to provide comfort?
Finally, what will happen in the
case-unlike Quinn or Ortiz-where expert testimony is not as clear or as unopposed? Courts are increasingly more
loath to settle so-called "battles of the
experts," especially where the expert testimony deals with psychiatric diagnosis
and/or predictions of future dangerousness.86 How will they construe expert
testimony in an area as volatile as the
disposition of alleged criminal offenders
with AIDS?
It is clear that the criminal justice
system is finally becoming aware of the
scope of the problem it faces. Recently,
356

a New York state supreme courtjustice
has called on the state legislature to
amend the Criminal Procedure Act to
attempt to deal with the issues under
discussion here. 87 In dismissing reckless
endangerment against a criminal defendant (in a case characterized by the
judge as the product of a "stormy gay
relationship [with] apparent sado-masochistic overtones"), Justice William D.
Friedmann placed the case in a social
context:
Recent criminal justice system experience with
AIDS infected persons should inspire considerable procedural and substantive changes in
the years to come. As AIDS-infected people
impact all aspects of the system , our courts
and local correctional authorities must contend with these persons who are charged with
crime and who are awaiting trial and/ or sentence with little or no prospect of being able
to participate in these procedures.ss

The problems raised here are overwhelming ones, and may appear, at first
blush, to be intractable and insurmountable. Whereas the goals of mental health
care have been fairly clearly articulated
in both statute and case law, 89 there has
been no serious consideration-either
episodic or broad-based-as to how such
issues "play out" in the AIDS dementia
context. Yet, they are problems with
which virtually every urban state's forensic system will have to deal in the alltoo-near future. Our national AIDS policy has for too long been characterized
by a "head in the sand" approach,90 and
the catastrophic results of that policy are
now being played out. We cannot allow
such an attitude of "willful blindness" 9 1
to color our treatment of individuals
who face desolation and, perhaps, inevBull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990
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itable death as unwanted participants in
the criminal justice system.
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ally to competency to stand trial, see Project:
Criminal procedure. 76 Geo L J 707, 86777 ( 1988). Although the subject of this article
has not yet received substantial attention,
scholars are beginning to examine the impact
of AIDS on substantive criminal law issues,
related to intent and culpability. Compare,
e.g., Field, Sullivan MA: AIDS and the criminal Jaw. L Med Health Care 15:46, 198788, with Robinson D: AIDS and the criminal
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( 1972). The defendant in Jackson was a severely retarded deaf mute individual who was
incapable of communicating by almost any
means. Id. at 717.
30. United States v. Hollis, 569 F. 2d 199, 205
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36. Id.
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exceed two-thirds of the authorized maximum term of imprisonment for the highest
class felony charged in the indictment. Id.
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41 Vand L Rev 111 ( 1988). On the ways that
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Perlin M: Competency, deinstitutionalization , and homelessness: a story of marginalization. 28 Houston L Rev (in press) ( 1990).
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mentally disordered offenders. (unpublished
manuscript)
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facially applicable to all incompetency to
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126924 (Calif. Super. Ct., San Francisco Cty.,
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for the abolition of the incompetency plea.
U Chi L Rev 40:66, 1972, or to allow for the
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who wish to plead guilty, see Winick B, Restructuring competency to stand trial. 32
UCLA L Rev 921-85 ( 1985). But see Wexler
D: Criminal Confinement and Dangerous
Mental Patients: Legal Issues of Confinement, Treatment, and Release. New York,
Plenum, 1976 (questioning Burt and Morris'
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are discussed critically in Perlin M, supra
note 31 , at §14.18.
People\'. Quinn, supra note I, at 29
Id
Id. See generally, DSM-II! 290.xx (listing
diagnostic criteria for dementia).
People v. Quinn, supra note 1, at 29
Id.
id.
See Orti::., supra note I, at 9, discussing NY
Crim Proc Law §210.40.
Id. n. 4. The roots of Longfellow's aphorism

Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 18, No. 4, 1990

AIDS-Related Dementia

can be found in the Talmud. See Soncino
(ed.): Berakoth [7a] , at 30 (small ed.) ("What
does [the Holy One] pray?-R. Zutra b. Tobi
said in the name of Rab: 'May it be My will
that My mercy may suppress my anger, and
that My mercy may prevail over My [other]
attributes, so that I may deal with My children in the attribute of mercy and, on their
behalf, stop short of the limit of strict justice"'). We wish to thank Dr. Thomas Litwack for calling our attention to the Talmudic roots of this quotation , and Aron Rosenbaum for providing the accurate
Talmudic citation.
62. Ortiz, supra note l, at 9
63. Pursuant to NY Crim Proc Law §§730. 10.70
64. Patient A was admitted to a forensic psychiatric center after charges of robbery, weapons
possession, and parole violation from a
county jail that made no reference to his
medical condition in its transmittal documents. After the forensic center accepted responsibility for the patient, it immediately
transferred him to a general hospital (because
the forensic facility could not provide the
requisite medical care). The general hospital,
in turn , transferred the patient to a second
general hospital that had been designated to
provide backup care for persons with AIDS.
Despite the patient's nonambulatory status,
the forensic hospital provided 24-hour-perday guard service, pursuant to its custodial
responsibilities under NY Crim Proc Law
§730 el seq. The patient died within a month
of his admission. Patient B was ordered committed to OMH after a determination of
incompetency to stand trial on felony charges
of sodomy, reckless endangerment, and endangering the welfare of a child. At the time
of the incompetency finding, the patient was
receiving appropriate medical treatment prusuant to a contractual agreement entered into
between the city jail (in which he was first
lodged following arrest) and a medical longterm care facility with specific expertise in
caring for persons with AIDS. OMH refused
to accept the patient, based on its inability to
provide adequate medical care as well as the
ability of the long-term facility in which he
had been housed to provide such appropriate
care. The patient died two weeks after the
finding of incompetence. Like Patient B, Patient C was similarly ordered committed to
OMH after an incompetency declaration in
a case charging second degree murder. Unlike the cases of Patients A and B, Patient C
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had a prior record of psychiatric hospitalization, and there was no dispute as to whether
this was the sole ca use of his incompetence.
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the patient (for reasons similar to those offered in the case of Patient B), the sending
jurisdiction demanded that the post-incompetency finding transfer be effectuated. After
lengthy negotiations, it was agreed that the
state would accept the patient at the Forensic
Psychiatric Center and that the city would
provide necessary backup medical care. The
patient has been so housed since October
1988 (20 months as of the date of submission
of this revised article) and is still alive.
See supra note 64.
Id.
Id.
Compare Ass'n of the Bar of the City of NY:
AIDS and the criminal justice system: A final
report and recommendations. 236, 1989 (recommending, at a minimum , the establishment of formal liaisons and cooperative
agreements among all institutions engaging
in providing medical and psychiatric care to
those in custody).
Beyo nd the scope of this article is the related
question of the use of AIDS dementia as a
mitigating factor to lower a first degree murder charge to second degree murder. See First
AIDS dementia defense helps acquit murder
defendant. AIDS Policy and Law (Sept. 21,
1988) 5, discussing People v. Braga, supra
note 50. On the difference in mental states
in homicide generally, see LaFave WR':
Modern Criminal Law (ed 2). St. Paul , MN,
West, 1988.
Notwithstanding the clear direction of Jackson, it is now clear that it is not a palliative
for all problems that arise in this area. See
M. Perlin supra note 31, §14.16 at 251-52
(discussing problems caused by Supreme
Court's failure to specify limits of "reasonable period" of time during which charges
could be left open, and concomitant problems of over-lengthy hospitalizations); see
generally, Winick B, s upra note 53, at 94142; Gobert J: Competency to stand trial: a
pre- and post-Jackson analysis. 40 Tenn L
Rev 659-88 ( 1973).
Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738
In an ordinary case of a patient no/ likely to
be restored to trial within such a time, the
patient must be released or civilly committed. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. In cases where
the defendant's dementia appears to be transitory or in the event of the discovery of
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emerging treatments that would significantly
prolong the life expectancy of a person with
AIDS, it might be entirely appropriate to
hospitalize such· an individual pending either
restoration to competency or a determination that competency was not restorable
within the foreseeable future, in accordance
with the mandates of Jackson.
73. Because state statute requires OMH to maintain custody of such patients and to produce
them for trial upon restoration of competency, see §730.40, it is the internal policy of
OMH to place all individuals being held for
trial in a secure, forensic facility, notwithstanding the fact that there is no explicit
statutory bar in New York prohibiting civil
hospitals from accepting !ST patients.
74. Notwithstanding Jackson , about half of all
jurisdictions still statutorily permit indefinite
hospitalization based solely on a finding of
continuing incompetency to stand trial. Winick, supra note 53, at 704; see also, M. Perlin,
supra note 31, at§ 14.16. Subsequent to Jackson, the New York system permits incompetent felony defendants to be hospitalized
for two-thirds the maximum sentence for the
offense charged. §730.50(3); Brown v. Warden, Great Meadow Correctional Facility,
683 F.2d 348, 353 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1982): see
also Choper JH: The Supreme Court and
individual rights. 83 Mich L Rev 1-222
( 1984) (discussion of pre- and post-Jackson
cases involving commitment of the mentally
ill in, context of competency to stand trial
and continued involuntary institutionalization). Nonetheless, at least one commentator
has questioned the constitutionality of New
York's current comprehensive statutory
scheme for disposing of the "incapacitated
accused." Lewin T: Criminal law procedure.
24 Syracuse L Rev 7 5, 77 ( 197 3) ("On the
surface it appears that New York's new procedures pertaining to incapacitated persons
charged with committing misdemeanors are
in compliance with Jackson, for this class of
accused has had its charges dismissed and is
treated as civil patients. Accused felons, however, are a different matter") (footnote omitted). Generally, if the defendant becomes
competent to stand trial after being detained
for a period of time in a mental facility, New
York decisions have held confinement to a
state facility must be credited against a later
sentence of imprisonment if the formerly
incompetent defendant is subsequently
found guilty. Negro v. Dickens, 22 A.D.2d
406, 413-14, 255 N.Y.S.2d 804, 810-11
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(1965); People v. Pugh, 51 A.D.2d 1407,
1408, 381 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (1976) (eight
years of confinement in Matteawan State
Hospital, after judicial determination that a
defendant convicted of second degree burglary and petit larceny who subsequently became mentally ill while incarcerated and
awaiting sentencing and therefore lacked the
mental capacity to be sentenced, credited as
"jail time" upon his certification as a sane
person, capable of being sentenced). Moreover, the prevailing view in most jurisdictions
is the abolishment of the enumeration of
different types of incarceration and their
merger into a single concept of "jail time'',
including time spent in "custody," no matter
where the time was spent. Id. at 418; see,
e.g., State v. Johnson , 167 N.W.2d 696, 70102 (Iowa 1969); In re Bennett, 71 Cal. 2d
117, 119, 454 P.2d 33, 35, 77 Cal. Rptr. 457 ,
459 ( 1969): In re Stearns, 343 Mass. 53, 55,
175 N.E.2d 470, 472 (1961); Ex parte
Wright, 31 Wash. 2d 905, 908, 200 P.2d 478,
481 ( 1948).
75. Compare People ex rel. Kaganovitch v. Wilkins, 23 A.D.2d 178, 259 N.Y.S.2d 462
( 1965) (failure to provide treatment is cruel
and unusual punishment for sex offender
who was sentenced to indeterminate sentence
from one day to life following guilty plea to
second-degree assault with intent to commit
sodomy): see also NY Correct Law §70(2)
(b)-(c) (McKinney 1988) (directing that correctional facilities may establish and maintain any type of program of treatment, not
inconsistent with other provisions of law, but
with due regard to the health, safety and right
of every person in the custody of the department of corrections to receive humane treatment).
76. See, e.g., People v. Darry P., 96 Misc. 2d 12,
26-31, 408 N. Y .S.2d 880, 889-92 (Crim. Ct.
1978) (indefinite confinement without treatment of one who has been found not criminally responsible may be so inhumane as to
be cruel and unusual punishment). On the
general question, see Albert N: A right to
treatment for AIDS patients? 92 Dick L Rev
743-76 (I 988). Spece R: AIDS: due process,
equal protection, and the right to treatment.
Issues in Law Med 4:283-344, 1988.
77. Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 498, 495
N.E.2d 337, 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74, 81 (1986)
("neither mental illness nor institutionalization per se can stand as a justification for
overriding an individual's fundamental right
to refuse [treatment] .... Rather, due process
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requires that a court balance the individual's
liberty interest against the State's asserted
compelling need on the facts of each case to
determine whether ... [treatment] may be
forcibly administered."). Rivers is discussed
extensively in Perlin M: State constitutions
and statutes as sources of rights for the mentally disabled: the last frontier? 20 Loy LA L
Rev 1249-327 (1987), and M. Perlin, supra
note 31, at §5.45 Compare Washington v.
Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990) (limiting right
to refuse treatment in cases involving convicted prisoners).
See, e.g., Rivers, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81 (proposed involuntary treatment must be "narrowly tailored to give substantive effect to
the patient's liberty interest, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, including the patient's best interests, the benefits to
be gained from the treatment, the adverse
side effects associated with the treatment, and
any less intrusive alternative means. The
State would bear the burden to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the proposed treatment meets these criteria.").
N.Y. Pub. Health L. §§2504, 2805-d (McKinney 1988) (statutory right to control
course of treatment); N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R .
§4401-a (McKinney 1988) (same); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-77, 420 N.E.2d 64,
70-71, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-73 (1981)
(the right to refuse treatment is fully embraced in the common-law right to self determination); see also, Cantor N: A patient's
decision to decline life-saving medical treatment: bodily integrity versus the preservation
of life. 26 Rutgers L Rev 228-264, 236-38
(1973). But cf Von Holden v. Chapman, 87
A.D.2d 66, 70, 450 N. Y.S.2d 623, 626 ( 1982)
(state may prohibit individuals from engaging in specified activities which are inherently
hazardous to their lives, e.g., "hunger
strikes".) See generallr, M. Perlin , supra note
31, chapter 18.
See e.g., Rivers, 504 N.Y.S. 2d at 77 (class
consisted of involuntarily committed mental
patients) (right to refuse).
NY State Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752. 755, 768-70
(E.D.N.Y. 1973) (class consisted of residents
of state institution for the mentally retarded)
(right to habilitation).
Because incarcerated persons are ineligible
for Medicaid, see 42 U .S.C. §I 396d: 42
C.F.R. §435.1009, the administrative transfer
of persons with AIDS to other health care
facilities might enable these individuals to
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become eligible for Medicaid financial assistance.
83. On the ways in which AIDS dementia is, for
purposes of testamentary capacity assessment, like other neurological disorders, see
Dintzer, supra note 26, at 168-70 (discussing
cases involving testators with epilepsy and
Parkinson 's Disease).
84. See Dintzer, supra note 26, at 175 n. 116,
citing Morin SF, Charles KA, Malyon AK:
The psychological impact of AIDS on gay
men. Am Psychologist 39: 1288-93, 1984
(additional psychosocial stress caused by social ostracism). Compare Messitte P: AIDS:
a judicial perspective. Judicature 72: 205,
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85. Compare supra note 79.
86. Compare Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983), to id. at 916 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting). See generally, Perlin M: The Supreme
Court, the mentally disabled criminal defendant, and symbolic values: random decisions, hidden rationales, or doctrinal abyss?
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of the strategic and tactical issues to be confronted in the representation of persons with
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notes from the trenches. 49 Ohio St L J 883928 ( 1989).
87. See Anderson: Judge asks new criteria for
AIDS cases. NY L J, Jan. 31: 1, 1989.
88. People v. Hammond , Misc. 2d N.Y.S. 2d
(Sup. Ct., Jan. 31, 1989); reprinted in NY L
J 1989. 26, Jan . 31: Specifically, Justice
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Article 730 to mandate physical as well as
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for defendants with AIDS symptomatology.
Id.
89. See, e.g., Yinokur v. Balzaretti, 62 A.O. 2d
990, 403 N.Y.S. 2d 316 (1978) (state public
policy is one of "rigorous protection" of the
rights of the mentally disabled); see also, NY
Mental Hygiene L §33.02 to .03 (McKinney
1988) (notice of rights of the mentally disabled; quality of care and treatment).
90. See, e.g., Shilts R: And The Band Played On.
New York, Penguin, 1987.
91. See, e.g.. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23
( 1956) ("This Court would have to be wi/1fullr blind not to know that there have in the
past been prejudicial trial errors which called
for the reversal of convictions of indigent
defendants .... ) (emphasis added).
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